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Abstract
Campaigning at the district level can deliver electoral payoffs in a range of countries despite variations 
in electoral systems. However, effects may not be consistent. Campaigns do not occur in a vacuum, 
and contextual factors, exogenous to the campaign activity itself, may have a significant effect on 
the level of their electoral impact. The 2015 General Election in Britain is a particularly interesting 
case as there was a key contextual factor which could impact significantly on the effectiveness of 
the parties’ campaigns; the electoral unpopularity of the Liberal Democrats. Using a unique new 
dataset, this article assesses the contextual impact of party equilibrium at both national and district 
levels on campaign effectiveness. It represents the first attempt on a large scale to systematically 
assess the impact of party popularity on campaign effectiveness and demonstrates at both national 
and district levels the importance of contextual effects on election campaigns.
Keywords
elections, district-level campaigning, electoral context, Britain, popularity equilibrium
Accepted: 22 February 2018
Introduction
A significant academic literature has demonstrated that if effectively deployed, more 
intense campaigning at the district or constituency level can deliver electoral payoffs. 
Both single country and comparative studies tend to show similar patterns despite varia-
tions in electoral systems (see, for example, Denver and Hands, 1997; Fisher et al., 2011; 
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Gschwend and Zittel, 2015; Karp et al., 2007; Sudulich et al., 2013).1 However, the cam-
paign effects may not necessarily be consistent in respect of electoral payoffs. Campaigns 
do not occur in a vacuum, and contextual factors, exogenous to the campaign activity 
itself, may have a significant effect on the level of their electoral impact (Fisher et al., 
2011). The 2015 General Election in Britain is a particularly interesting case, as compared 
with previous elections, there was a key contextual factor which could impact signifi-
cantly on the effectiveness of the parties’ campaigns; the electoral popularity of the 
Liberal Democrats, which had plummeted since 2010. By way of contrast, the relative 
popularity of the Conservatives and Labour between the two elections of 2010 and 2015 
remained largely unchanged. This provides the environment whereby we can compare the 
effects of both similar and changed levels of party popularity on campaign effectiveness. 
We do this by assessing the contextual impact of the popularity equilibrium (Fisher et al., 
2011) at both national and district levels. In essence, we posit that the Liberal Democrats’ 
dramatic decline in popularity was highly likely to limit the party’s campaign effective-
ness. We, therefore, seek to answer three questions:
1. Did the electoral effectiveness of parties’ campaigns reflect national levels of 
party popularity?
2. Did the electoral effectiveness of parties’ campaigns vary by party opponent?
3. Did the electoral effectiveness of parties’ campaigns vary depending on levels of 
popularity at the constituency level?
This represents the first attempt on a large scale – either in the British context or else-
where – to systematically assess the impact of party popularity on campaign effective-
ness. This makes the article significant for three principal reasons. First, it demonstrates 
both conceptually and empirically how campaign effectiveness varies according to (a) 
national popularity, (b) party competition and (c) local popularity. Second, it shows how 
levels of electoral popularity – both low and high – impact upon the electoral effective-
ness of campaigns. Third, it demonstrates how parties seek to mitigate the effects of 
electoral context and with what degree of success. In sum, the article shows both whether 
campaigns are electorally effective and why this is the case.
The Popularity Equilibrium
The popularity equilibrium captures the idea that both absolute and relative levels of party 
popularity will affect the electoral impact of party campaigns. In general, campaigning 
will tend to be more electorally effective when elections are more marginal. But these 
effects are moderated by party popularity. Campaigns will tend to deliver more electoral 
benefits where parties are not unusually popular or unpopular: there is popularity equilib-
rium within the parties’ usual range of support. In other words, parties should be neither 
extremely popular nor extremely unpopular – there is, in effect, a normal state of affairs 
in terms of the relative popularity of the parties (Fisher et al., 2011: 818). This idea is 
informed by the work of Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009), who argue that in terms of 
persuading people to vote, the principal effects of mobilisation will be on those people 
who on the cusp of deciding to cast their ballot. In their example (Arceneaux and 
Nickerson, 2009: 5), they suggest that if mobilisation on average increases the probability 
of voting by 0.07 (seven percentage points), the campaign effort will have little effect on 
voters whose probability of voting is more than 0.57 or less than 0.43.
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The same logic may also apply in terms of vote choice. If parties are unusually unpop-
ular, the impact of their campaigns is less likely to be decisive (since voters will be less 
receptive) and equally, for more popular parties, the campaign is less likely to impact on 
voters’ decisions since they will already have decided to vote for them. Supporting this 
idea, research using experimental methods has shown that campaign interventions are 
affected by the level of popularity of the party (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Hillygus, 
2005; Niven, 2001). Even in situations of popularity equilibrium, all parties are not 
equally popular in all seats, so local campaign efficacy will tend to be greatest in seats 
where individual parties are in a competitive situation (Fieldhouse et al., 2014). Therefore, 
the relationship between popularity and campaign efficacy will also depend on the geo-
graphical distribution of support. However, because local popularity is highly dependent 
on national popularity (as indicated by the empirical power of uniform swing), the central 
point remains valid: unpopular parties are unlikely to be able to persuade electors who are 
opposed to them, and in such situations, the positive effects of more popular parties are 
likely to be more limited, since their supporters are more likely to already be ‘converted 
to the cause’. Levels of popularity can therefore be assessed both in terms of the national 
standing of the parties and also their standing in individual districts.
Assessing Party Popularity
The electoral popularity of parties between general elections can be assessed in three 
ways. First, the parties’ performance in second-order elections provides indicators of 
popularity even if voters’ motivations may vary at different levels of government. The 
Liberal Democrats experienced repeatedly poor results in elections at second-order elec-
tions levels after 2010. In 2010, Liberal Democrats represented around 19% of elected 
councillors in Britain; by 2015, that figure had fallen to 9%. And, the European Elections 
of 2014 saw the party secure just 6.9% of the vote and only one seat, compared with 
13.8% and 11 seats in 2009. Second, parties’ standing can be assessed by regular national 
opinion polls. Of course, one feature of the 2015 election was the failure of the final opin-
ion polls to predict the result – they under-estimated the extent of the Conservative lead 
prior to the 2015 election. But, they correctly predicted the level of support for the Liberal 
Democrats (and indeed the Scottish National Party (SNP)) (Cowley and Kavanagh, 
2016). At the national level, there was popularity equilibrium for the Conservative and 
Labour parties – neither was especially unpopular (nor indeed, especially popular) – sug-
gesting conditions for both parties to have effective campaigns. For the Liberal Democrats, 
however, the story of much of the 2010–2015 electoral cycle was one of significant 
unpopularity at national level. From soon after the 2010 election, Liberal Democrat poll 
ratings fell dramatically and never recovered, falling behind UKIP after early 2013 
(Figure 1). Under these conditions – with the party performing poorly in opinion polls 
and second-order elections – we would expect the effectiveness of Liberal Democrat 
campaigning in general to be diminished. In effect, the Liberal Democrats’ sudden fall in 
popularity (to levels not seen since 1970) would make voters significantly less receptive 
to the party’s campaign efforts.
A third key way by which parties’ electoral standing can be captured is through voters’ 
perceptions of which party is likely to be victorious in a district or constituency. This 
approach has the advantage of translating macro (national) levels of party popularity into 
micro (district) level assessments and is operationalised through large scale individual 
level surveys. Normally, such an exercise would be extremely difficult to operationalise. 
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However, in this case, the British Election Survey panel (Fieldhouse et al., 2015) with 
over 30,000 cases allows for an estimate of the likelihood of winning the constituency (on 
a scale of 0–100) by taking a mean from the estimates of all respondents in the constitu-
ency. Given the size of the panel, this is based on around 50 respondents in each constitu-
ency and is subject to quite large margins of error.2 We illustrate the distribution of mean 
constituency scores in Figures 2–4. As is evident, voter perceptions of Liberal Democrat 
victory were very different from those of the other two parties. In only around 5% of seats 
were the Liberal Democrats on average given a 51% or higher chance of victory. This 
equated to 31 seats – more than the party actually won, but substantially lower than the 
57 seats won in 2010. By way of contrast, in some 56% of seats the Conservatives were 
given an average chance of victory of 51% or higher, while the same was true in 58% of 
seats for Labour.
Figure 1. Monthly Vote Intention, May 2010–May2015.
Figure 2. Conservative Chance of Winning Constituency.
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Data and Measurement
The first step in evaluating the parties’ success in respect of their district-level campaigns 
is to create a measurable index of campaign intensity. To achieve this, data are derived 
from a survey of the election agents of Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat can-
didates who stood for 629 of the 632 constituencies in Great Britain – a total of 1887.3 
The data reported are based on 912 valid responses, comprising 244 Conservative, 336 
Labour and 332 Liberal Democrat agents. The responses were representative of the total 
population of these agents, based on the electoral status of their seats (see Appendix 1).4
Responses from the survey are used to created additive scales for the core components 
of a district campaign for all of the surveyed parties: preparation, organisation, manpower, 
use of computers, use of telephones, polling day activity, use of direct mail, level of door-
step canvassing, leafleting and electronic campaigning (Denver and Hands, 1997; Fisher 
et al., 2011). We enhance the scales used in previous studies by adding variables reflecting 
developments in preparation and e-campaigning. These scales are entered into a Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) to create an index of campaign intensity. Using conventional 
cut-off criteria, the PCA suggests one factor is sufficient to represent the variance in the 
Figure 3. Labour Chance of Winning Constituency.
Figure 4. Liberal Democrats Chance of Winning Constituency.
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original variables in the index (see Appendix 1). The PCA produces factor scores which are 
then standardised around a mean of 100, which allows easy comparisons between parties.5
Table 1 illustrates the mean level of campaign intensity for the three parties together 
with the maximum and minimum levels. The Conservatives and Labour ran stronger cam-
paigns overall, while the Liberal Democrats ran, on average, less intensive campaigns. In 
order to corroborate these findings, we also examine individual level data from Wave 6 of 
the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al., 2015). Table 2 summarises whether the par-
ties contacted an individual elector over the last 4 weeks of the campaign and in how many 
ways (telephone, letter/leaflet, home visit, contact in the street, email, text message and 
other modes). Of course, some of these contacts could include central party campaigning 
efforts, but the rank order in terms of campaign intensity illustrated in Table 2 is replicated 
in terms of both the proportions contacted and the number of different contacts. Labour 
contacted 43% of electors, the Conservatives 38% and the Liberal Democrats 25%. The 
average number of different contacts similarly shows the same rank order. As a further test, 
we use data from the face-to-face post-election survey (Fieldhouse et al., 2016). These 
capture direct personal contacts (on the doorstep or in the street) and so are only local 
campaign efforts. Once again, the rank order between parties is replicated.
These measures of campaign intensity, however, are unlikely to be equally distributed 
across all constituencies. We would expect a party to run its most intense campaigns in 
the most marginal seats it was seeking to gain or hold, and its next most intense cam-
paigns in the seats that it held, but where there was much less chance of losing the seat – 
so-called ‘safe seats’ – as local organisation and resources in such seats tend to be greater, 
both in terms of membership and often wealth (Fisher, 2000; Fisher et al., 2006). All 
parties may seek to divert resources to the most key battleground seats, but resources such 
as human capital are often less mobile (Fisher and Denver, 2009). Finally, we would 
expect parties to run their least intense campaigns in those seats where it has little chance 
of winning, since as Karp et al. (2007: 92) suggest, ‘parties will expend greater effort on 
mobilising voters when the expected benefits of turning out voters are greatest, relative to 
cost’. Such a pattern is likely to be more pronounced in a majoritarian system where there 
Table 1. Overall Campaign Intensity Scores.
Con Lab Lib Dems
Mean Score 112 116 87
Maximum 225 225 194
Minimum 49 55 47
Std. dev 32.03 30.88 30.89
Con: Conservatives; Lab: Labour; Lib Dems: Liberal Democrats; Std. dev: standard deviation.
Table 2. Individual Level Contacts over Last 4 Weeks of Campaign.
Con Lab Lib Dem
% contacted 38 43 25
Mean no. of contact types (max 7) 1.43 1.51 1.30
% contacted in at home or in streeta 12.7 16.4 6.7
Source: British Election Study Wave 6: n = 30,013 (GB).
aBritish Election Study post-election face-to-face 2015 survey (n = 2987).
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are fewer gains to be made in terms of seats from campaigning in ‘hopeless’ seats, 
although there is evidence that such patterns can also be observed in multi-member sys-
tems (Viñuela et al., 2015).
The targeting of resources will reflect both the level of central management by national 
party headquarters, seeking to distribute effort in the constituencies effectively (the cen-
tral input) and the ability of constituency-level parties to build on that targeted support 
(the local output). The success of targeting will also be a function of whether the central 
party has clear objectives in respect of the desired electoral outcomes. This captures the 
ambitions and strategy of a party and the extent to which they are achievable given the 
electoral context. Thus, the benefits of targeting may be conditional upon whether parties 
have clear objectives (such as winning a small majority or denying another party a major-
ity rather than just trying to win as many seats as possible).
Table 3 illustrates the central input into targeting. It shows the level of central manage-
ment of district campaigns by national parties, disaggregated by the electoral status of the 
seat for the particular party. There are four categories of seat: ultra marginal, where the 
winning margin after the 2010 General Election was less than 5%; marginal, where the 
winning margin was between 5% and 10%; held, where a party held the seats with a win-
ning margin of more than 10% – so-called ‘safe seats’; and not held, where a party did not 
hold a seat and is more than 10% behind the winning party – so-called ‘hopeless’ seats. 
The index of centralisation is calculated using a PCA from responses to questions related 
to central management of campaigns (see Appendix 1), and factor scores are standardised 
around a mean of 100, allowing comparisons between parties and the electoral status of 
seats. The level of central management for both Conservatives and Labour was closely 
related to the marginality of the seat as we would expect. In the case of the Liberal 
Democrats, the pattern was slightly different, with the most central management activity 
taking place in the party’s safe seats. Under conditions of national popularity equilibrium, 
this would be a curious finding. But, of course, these conditions did not apply to the 
Liberal Democrats in 2015. As an unpopular party, a rational strategy would be a defen-
sive one, effectively focusing resources on the those seats it had most chance of retaining 
– its ‘safe seats’ – and effectively ‘sacrificing’ those seats where the party was likely to 
lose by re-directing resource. In effect, this is what we observe.
We assess the local output of targeting in Table 4, which disaggregates the mean cam-
paign intensity of the three parties by the electoral status of the seat relative to that party. 
For the Conservatives and Labour, the distribution is exactly as predicted – the most 
intense campaigns took place in the most marginal seats, and campaigns in ‘safe’ seats 
were much more intense than in ‘hopeless’ ones. Not only that, Conservative and Labour 
Table 3. Distribution of Party Centralisation by Electoral Status.
All Ultra marginal
<5%
Marginal
5%–10%
Held
10%+
Not held
10%+
Con 112 165 130 105 103
Lab 101 148 119 102 88
Lib Dems 99 142 129 153 90
Con: Conservatives; Lab: Labour; Lib Dems: Liberal Democrats.
The N values for each category are as follows: Conservative – ultra marginal (18), marginal (32), held (104), 
not held (90); Labour – ultra marginal (33), marginal (40), held (77), not held (186); Liberal Democrats – 
ultra marginal (17), marginal (20), held (19), not held (276).
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campaigning were pretty evenly matched in ultra marginal and safe seats, while that of 
Labour was more intense in marginal seats (5%–10% winning margin). More noteworthy 
is the distribution of Liberal Democrat campaign effort. As predicted, campaigns in ultra 
marginal seats were more intense than in marginal seats and least intense than in hopeless 
seats. However, the Liberal Democrats’ strongest campaigns were, on average, in the 
party’s safe seats, reflecting the central input, and nearly matching the intensity of 
Conservative and Labour seats in their ultra marginal seats. The impact of the Liberal 
Democrats’ dramatic decline in popularity is therefore clear – the party effectively 
retreated into its safest seats.
The Electoral Impact
Given the national levels of party popularity, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 1: Liberal Democrat campaigns were less electorally effective than Labour 
or Conservative campaigns.
This is estimated using ordinary least squares regression (OLS), with share of the elec-
torate in 2015 as the dependent variable. Share of the electorate is a better indicator of 
campaign effects than share of the vote since it captures both vote share and capacity to 
mobilise the electorate to turn out. The model we employ in our first analyses is as fol-
lows. Each party’s share of the electorate in 2015 is regressed on the campaign intensity 
index, controlling for the share of the electorate in 2010, personal incumbency and coun-
try (Table 5). Personal incumbency is often a strong predictor of electoral success and can 
be enhanced through personalised campaigns – a trend observable across a number of 
different countries (De Winter and Baudewyns, 2015; Eder et al., 2015; Gschwend and 
Zittel, 2015; Zittel, 2015). We also add country as a control since a particular characteris-
tic of the 2015 election was the performance of the SNP in Scotland, where the party won 
56 of the 59 seats and 50% of the Scottish vote, having won only six seats and 20% of the 
vote in 2010.
The use of the share of the electorate in 2010 as a control makes the model a dynamic 
test and also ensures that other variables that are correlated with previous vote, such as 
demographics, are effectively controlled. In addition, previous electorate share will also 
capture previous campaign efforts. Thus, insofar as campaign efforts are correlated over 
time, the true extent of campaign effects may actually be under-estimated. The test is a 
stiff one – not surprisingly, previous share of the electorate captures a great deal of the 
variance, so the model provides a robust test of whether or not constituency campaigning 
made a positive and significant contribution to electoral performance. The results are 
Table 4. Distribution of Campaign Intensity by Electoral Status.
Ultra marginal
<5%
Marginal
5%–10%
Held
10%+
Not held
10%+
Con 150 135 121 87
Lab 148 142 128 100
Lib Dems 135 127 144 77
Con: Conservatives; Lab: Labour; Lib Dems: Liberal Democrats.
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clear: for all three principal GB parties, more intensive district campaigning yielded 
greater electoral payoffs.6
To illustrate the practical significance and substantive impact of these findings, we can 
examine the predictive margins of campaign intensity.7 The model suggests that a 
Conservative candidate whose campaign reached the average intensity of a Conservative 
marginal seat (140)8 could expect to win 26.3% of the electorate compared to a similar 
candidate with a campaign intensity of a hopeless seat (87) who would win 24.7% of the 
electorate. The difference of around 1.6 percentage points suggests a fairly solid increase 
in support for Conservative candidates where they ran an intensive local campaign. 
Indeed, all other things being equal, the loss of this share of the electorate would have cost 
at least an estimated nine seats – enough to deny the Conservatives a majority. The cor-
responding figures for Labour are 20.4% (campaign intensity 145) and 19.0% (campaign 
intensity 100) which is a difference of 1.4 percentage points (leading to the avoidance of 
an estimated loss of at least 12 seats). In the case of the Liberal Democrats, a better com-
parison is that between the highest campaign intensity scores which occurred in safe seats 
compared with the party’s hopeless seats. These results suggest a difference of 1.8 per-
centage points of the electorate where a candidate reached an average campaign intensity 
of a Liberal Democrat held seat (149) compared to a similar candidate where the average 
campaign intensity mirrored that found in hopeless seats (77). The results suggest that 
local campaign intensity did provide a boost in support – but not enough to save the 
majority of Liberal Democrat seats. However, contrary to Hypothesis 1, Liberal Democrat 
campaigns were not less electorally effective than those of the Conservatives or Labour 
in terms of average marginal gain in share of the electorate by seat.
The Impact of Rival Parties
To assess the second research question, the next step is to examine the effects of contests 
with different rival parties. We do this by assessing whether there is evidence of differen-
tial campaign effects, by comparing the effects of each party’s campaigns against differ-
ent opponents using interaction terms between campaign intensity and the incumbent 
party. This allows us to assess variation in campaign effectiveness depending upon which 
Table 5. The Electoral Impact of Constituency Campaigning by the Principal GB Parties.
Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats
 b Std. 
error
Sig. b Std. 
error
Sig. b Std. 
error
Sig.
Constant −2.25 0.58 ** 0.97 0.63 n.s. −4.77 0.40 **
Share of the electorate 2010 0.96 0.02 ** 0.81 0.03 ** 0.38 0.02 **
Personal incumbent 1.66 0.42 ** 3.52 0.49 ** 8.10 0.54 **
Scotland −0.63 0.53 n.s. −11.02 0.62 ** 2.19 0.41 **
Wales −0.03 0.54 n.s. −1.17 0.76 n.s. 0.39 0.54 n.s.
Campaign intensity 0.03 0.00 ** 0.03 0.01 ** 0.04 0.01 **
Adj. R2 0.971 0.908 0.889
n 244 336 332
Dependent variable: share of the electorate 2015.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; n.s.: not statistically significant.
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Figure 5. Predictive Margins of Conservative Campaigns by Seat Type (England and Wales Only).
Figure 6. Predictive Margins of Labour Campaigns by Seat Type (England and Wales Only).
Figure 7. Predictive Margins of Liberal Democrat Campaigns by Seat Type (England and Wales 
Only).
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party held the seat following the 2010 election. Given the effects of the SNP’s very strong 
performance, which effectively rendered prior standing in the constituencies to be mean-
ingless, we confine our analysis to England and Wales.9 Given the unpopularity of the 
Liberal Democrats at the national level and the distribution of the party’s campaign 
resources, we hypothesise the following:
Hypothesis 2: Conservative campaigns were more effective in Liberal Democrat seats 
than in Labour ones.
Hypothesis 3: Labour campaigns were more effective in Liberal Democrat seats than 
in Conservative ones
Hypothesis 4: Liberal Democrat campaigns were most effective in the party’s own 
seats.
Our model uses dummy variables to denote the opposing incumbent party (Conservative, 
Labour or Liberal Democrat) and then the interaction terms for campaigning in those seats, 
with Conservative seats as the reference category. These results are shown graphically in 
Figures 5–7, which compare the predictive margins for the three parties comparing campaigns 
in the range from the lowest campaign intensity for that party to the highest, holding the other 
variables constant. The full results from the modelling are shown in the Appendix 1 (Table A1).
What emerges from these analyses are some clear patterns. First, in terms of offensive 
campaigns, both the Conservative and Labour campaigns were more effective in Liberal 
Democrat–held seats as their campaign intensity increased – particularly so for Labour. 
Against each other, the effects of increased campaigning were more limited, confirming 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, increasing campaign intensity 
paid off far more in Conservative seats than in Labour ones but was most effective in 
seats the party already held, confirming Hypothesis 4 and suggesting that without intense 
campaigning in the party’s nominally ‘safe’ seats, the outcome could have been far worse.
The Popularity Equilibrium at District Level
So far, we have suggested that we would expect parties’ pre-election popularity at national 
level to impact upon the degree to which campaigns delivered electoral payoffs. Thus, 
where parties were at a level of popularity within a normal range (as was the case with the 
Conservatives and Labour), campaigns would deliver electoral benefits, whereas where a 
party’s popularity changes significantly (as in the case of the Liberal Democrats), cam-
paigns would be less likely to deliver payoffs. An analysis of a single election, however, 
has limited power to identify how national level popularity influences campaign effec-
tiveness. Certainly, we observe electoral payoffs for the Conservatives and Labour and 
also stronger performances against the Liberal Democrats. However, we also detect 
Liberal Democrat campaigns delivering payoffs. In order to test whether effectiveness 
varies systematically by the level of popularity of a party, we can examine the relationship 
at the district or constituency level.
We hypothesise that campaigns will vary in their electoral effectiveness depending 
upon the popularity of the party in an individual district. Parties, as we have seen, antici-
pate this up to a point by targeting resources in seats where the electoral contest is likely 
to be closest. Accordingly, campaigns are generally weaker where parties are already 
popular (safe seats) or where they are unpopular (hopeless seats). Yet, such calculations 
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provide only a partial picture since they can only take into account limited evidence of 
shifts in popularity between elections and are based primarily on the degree of electoral 
competition rather than their own level of popularity in the district (although the two are 
interlinked). We anticipate that the effectiveness of campaigns will vary depending on the 
popularity of the party in each district in a curvilinear way. Under conditions of popularity 
equilibrium, this would produce an n-shaped curve. Parties’ campaigns would become 
more electorally effective as they became more popular but would reach a point of peak 
popularity, beyond which the impact of campaigns would start to decline.
Thus,
Hypothesis 5. The electoral effectiveness of parties’ district-level campaigns will be a 
quadratic function of their level of popularity in each district or constituency.
We assess this by integrating the district level scores of likelihood of winning from the 
British Election Study into the model of campaign effectiveness shown in Table 5. To 
capture the curvilinear nature of the relationship, we use both the measure of likelihood 
of winning and its squared term in the model. Both are then interacted with the measure 
of campaign intensity. As above, we control for the country in which the district is situ-
ated. Thus (where a is the party concerned),
Share of the Electorate b Personal Incumbency
b C
a a       2015 1
2
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The full results are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix 1, with the graphical represen-
tations shown in Figures 8–10. We are seeking to establish whether the electoral effects 
of campaign intensity are conditioned by the popularity of a party (as measured by elec-
tors’ perception of the chance of that party winning in their constituency). The figures 
suggest that this is indeed the case. Thus, in the case of Labour (Figure 9), campaigns 
were most effective where, on average, voters estimated that there was a 50% chance of 
victory. Where the chance was estimated to be below 50%, the electoral effects were 
progressively lower as the estimated chance of victory declined. Equally, as the estimated 
chances of success exceeded 50%, the electoral impact of campaigns progressively 
decreased. In the case of the Liberal Democrats (Figure 10), the findings are somewhat 
different. Here, there is much more shallow increase between 10% and 40% chance of 
victory. After that, the marginal effects delivered by constituency campaigns decline as 
the party’s estimated chances of success increased in a manner similar to Labour.
The model for the Conservatives (Figure 8) suggests that the party’s campaigns were most 
effective at around a 30% chance of victory. In this case, although the form of the curve is 
exactly as predicted, the three-way interaction between campaign intensity, the chances of 
victory and its squared term just fails to reach the conventional level of statistical significance. 
To test the robustness of this finding, therefore, we re-ran the model using share of the 
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Figure 10. Average Marginal Effect – Liberal Democrat Campaign.
Figure 9. Average Marginal Effect – Labour Campaign.
Figure 8. Average Marginal Effect – Conservative Campaign.
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electorate in 2010 as the popularity predictor, given that Conservative popularity did not 
change markedly between the two elections.10 Once again, the form of curve was as predicted 
and identifies an optimal point of campaign effectiveness where the party had won 30% of the 
electorate in 2010. The three-way interaction, in this case, was statistically significant.
Overall, Hypothesis 5 is largely supported, although with weaker evidence for the 
Conservatives. The popularity equilibrium at district level influences the degree to which 
campaigns deliver electoral payoffs – for all three parties, the electoral effectiveness of 
campaigns is conditioned by the perceived chances of victory. If voters perceive a party 
to have little chance of victory or perceive that their success is more likely, the electoral 
effectiveness of campaigns is diminished.
Conclusion
District-level campaigns are of key importance to parties’ overall campaign strategies, 
and more intense district-level or constituency-level campaigning tends to deliver elec-
toral payoffs. But campaigns are not equally effective all of the time. Comparative evi-
dence shows that the electoral context can condition the effectiveness of campaigns – if a 
party is particularly unpopular, its campaigns are less likely to be effective. These were 
certainly the conditions in which the Liberal Democrats found themselves in the 2015 
election. Yet despite the party losing a significant share of the vote (15%) as well as 49 
seats, our analyses suggest that its constituency-level campaigns were, up to a point, still 
electorally effective in terms of improving share of the electorate. The explanation for this 
lies in the party’s response to its unpopularity. Faced with national level unpopularity, the 
party ran a very defensive campaign, with most activity taking place in the party’s hith-
erto safe seats. Effective targeting of resources clearly matters. For example, what is also 
notable about the 2015 election compared with previous ones in Britain is that the 
Conservatives’ campaigns were electorally effective. Hitherto, the electoral impact of 
Conservative campaigning has varied because the party struggled to target resources 
effectively (Denver and Hands, 1997; Fisher et al., 2011). The evidence from 2015 is that 
that lesson had been learned – 2015 was the election when the Conservatives appeared to 
have cracked the effective management and operation of district-level campaigning.
However, what these analyses also show is that party popularity is a key influence on 
the electoral impact of campaigns. We observe this at both national and district levels, 
where four of our five hypotheses are confirmed. Our first hypothesis (Hypothesis1) was 
rejected. However, in respect of the comparative electoral effectiveness of Liberal 
Democrat and other parties’ campaigns, we do show that both Conservative and Labour 
campaigns were more effective in Liberal Democrat held seats than in those held by 
either the Conservatives or Labour (Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3). Equally, we show 
that the Liberal Democrats’ campaigns were more effective in seats the party already held 
(Hypothesis 4) – although not sufficiently effective to prevent the loss of most of them. 
Finally, we show at the district level that party popularity also conditions the campaign 
effectiveness of all parties (Hypothesis 5). In effect, the popularity equilibrium, measured 
at district level, is a key determinant of the electoral effectiveness of campaigns. These 
findings are highly significant since they demonstrate at both national and district levels 
the importance of contextual effects on election campaigns.
Of course, parties are not blind to their own levels of popularity and seek to compensate 
these effects if they can. The principal way in which parties can try and offset the impact of a 
change in equilibrium (when they become significantly less popular) is through the effective 
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distribution of campaign resources. As we observe, the Liberal Democrats were able to do this 
to an extent but not enough to prevent party losing most of its seats. The case of 2015, there-
fore, provides some important insight into the effects of exogenous factors on in the impact of 
campaigning and by doing so, we can show both whether campaigns were successful in elec-
toral terms and throw some light on explaining why they were successful. Overall, 2015 was 
the election when Conservative constituency campaigns ‘clicked’. But, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat campaigns also delivered positive electoral gains, suggesting, if nothing else, that 
the results could have been even worse for those two parties had their campaign efforts not 
been so targeted. All of which neatly illustrates that while campaign effects are important, 
their impact may be contingent on the electoral context and parties’ response to it.
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Notes
 1. Other key examples include André and Depauw (2016), Carty and Eagles (1999), Denver et al. (2003), 
Fieldhouse and Cutts (2009), Gerber and Green (2000), Johnston and Pattie (2014), Marsh (2004), 
Whiteley et al. (2013) and Whiteley and Seyd (1994).
 2. We use the responses from Wave 4 of the British Election Study, conducted in March 2015 before the 
campaign proper began. Any noise in the measurement will only serve to weaken the relationship in which 
we are interested; thereby producing more conservative estimates. As a test of validity, we correlate with 
share of the electorate for each party at the previous election. The correlations were Conservatives 0.91, 
Labour 0.86 and Liberal Democrats 0.84.
 3. No questionnaires were sent to agents in Buckingham (the Speaker’s seat) or to Rochdale and Heywood 
& Middleton. In the case of the latter two constituencies, the local authority (Rochdale) did not publish 
details of the agents.
 4. Data were also collected from 31 SNP, 21 Plaid Cymru and 204 UKIP agents but are not reported in this 
article.
 5. Where there were missing data on individual variables that formed part of these scales, multiple imputa-
tion was used, which took account of the individual party and the electoral status of the seat.
 6. We ran the models in Table 5 using share of the vote in 2015 as the dependent variable and share of the 
vote in 2010 as a control variable instead of the respective Share of the Electorate figures. The regressions 
produced almost identical findings in respect of the statistical significance of the variables and the signing 
of the coefficients, with the exception of the Scotland dummy in the Conservative model and the Constant 
in the Labour model, where the coefficient were identically signed but statistically significant.
 7. The predictive margins represent the difference in predicted vote share at different levels of campaign 
intensity (defined according to marginality of the seat) with all other variables at their observed values.
 8. The definition of ‘marginal’ is these estimates is below 10% – that is, ultra marginal and marginal 
combined.
 9. Given our analysis concerns only the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, we also remove 
seats held by Plaid Cymru from this analysis
10. Indeed, the Conservative share of the electorate in 2010 and mean likelihood of winning scores are highly 
correlated (0.91)
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Group Question
Preparation HOW PREPARED – JOBS
Preparation HOW PREPARED – CAMPAIGN FUNDS
Preparation HOW PREPARED – ELECTORAL REGISTER
Preparation HOW PREPARED – ELECTION ADDRESS
Preparation HOW PREPARED – PRINTING
Preparation HOW PREPARED – IDENTIFYING SUPPORTERS
Preparation STARTED SERIOUS PLANNING
Preparation USE OF PREVIOUS CANVASS RECORDS
Organisation % OF CONST COVERED BY ACTIVE LOCAL ORGS
Organisation HOW LONG AGO KNEW RESPONSIBLE
Organisation DELEGATED DUTIES – CANVASSING ORGANISER
Organisation DELEGATED DUTIES – POSTAL VOTES
Organisation DELEGATED DUTIES – CANDIDATE AIDE
Organisation DELEGATED DUTIES – COMPUTER OFFICER
Organisation LOCAL ORGAINSERS OR SUB-AGENTS
Manpower NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN WORKERS
Manpower NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY
Zittel T (2015) Constituency Candidates in Comparative Perspective – How Personalized Are Constituency 
Campaigns, Why, and Does It Matter? Electoral Studies 39: 286–294.
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Appendix 1
Calculation of Campaign Intensity Index
Responses to the questions below are grouped through additive scales into the following 
core components of constituency campaigning: Preparation, Organisation, Manpower, 
Computers, Polling day activity, Telephones, Direct mail, Canvassing, Leaflets and 
E-campaigning. These groups are then entered into a PCA, which produced the solution 
overleaf.
(Continued)
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Group Question
Computers DELEGATED DUTIES – COMPUTER OFFICER
Computers USE OF COMPUTERS – DIRECT MAIL
Computers USE OF COMPUTERS – CANVASS RETURNS
Computers USE COMPUTERISED ELECTORAL REGISTER
Computers COMPUTERS USED TO COMPILE KNOCK-UP LISTS
Computers ELECTION SOFTWARE PROVIDED BY PARTY HQ
Polling day activity GOOD MORNING LEAFLETS DELIVERED
Polling day activity VOTERS KNOCKED UP ON POLLING DAY
Polling day activity % OF CONSTITUENCY COVERED
Polling day activity NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY
Polling day activity VOLUNTEERS SENT INTO YOUR CONSTITUENCY
Telephones USE TELEPHONE CANVASSING IN CONSTITUENCY
Telephones OUTSIDE CANVASSING
Telephones USE TELEPHONE CANVASSING
Telephones TELEPHONE CANVASSING ORGANISED FROM OUTSIDE 
CONSTITUENCY
Telephones VOTERS CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE ON POLLING 
DAY
Direct mail LEAFLETS TARGETED AT PARTICULAR GROUPS
Direct mail DIRECT MAIL USED TO TARGET INDIVIDUAL VOTERS
Canvassing % OF ELECTORATE CANVASSED
Canvassing % OF ELECTORATE TELEPHONE CANVASSED?
Leaflets HOW MANY REGIONALLY/NATIONALLY PRODUCED 
LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED
Leaflets TOTAL NUMBER OF LOCALLY PRODUCED LEAFLETS
E-campaigning PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN – OPERATING AND 
MAINTAINING A WEBSITE
E-campaigning PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN – USING SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES
E-campaigning CONTACT VOTERS IN THE CONSTITUENCY BY TEXT 
MESSAGE
E-campaigning MAKE USE OF TWITTER TO COMMUNICATE WITH 
VOTERS
E-campaigning USE OF COMPUTERS – EMAILING VOTERS
E-campaigning LOCAL PARTY & CANDIDATE WEBSITE
E-campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT – MAINTAINING WEBSITE
E-campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT – EMAILING VOTERS
E-campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT – SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
E-campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT – VIDEO/IMAGE SHARING SITES
E-campaigning VOTERS CONTACTED BY TEXT ON POLLING DAY
E-campaigning VOTERS CONTACTED BY EMAIL ON POLLING DAY
E-campaigning CANDIDATE HAD CAMAPIGN TWITTER ACCOUNT
E-campaigning CANDIDATE HAD CAMAPIGN FACEBOOK ACCOUNT
E-campaigning PAID ADVERTS TAKEN OUT ON FACEBOOK AND/OR 
TWITTER
Appendix 1. (Continued)
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Principal Components Analysis Solution for Campaign Intensity.
Preparation 0.843
Organisation 0.780
Manpower 0.646
Computers 0.803
Canvassing 0.733
Leaflets 0.548
Polling day 0.864
Telephone 0.817
Mail 0.781
E-campaigning 0.608
Principal Components Analysis Solution for Centralisation.
Contact with central party 0.651
Central party computing assistance 0.604
Central party contact of voters 0.726
Length of time special organiser appointed 0.682
Representativeness of Responses.
Ultra marginal (%) Marginal (%) Safe held (%) Safe not held (%)
All Seats (631)
 Conservatives 11 15 36 38
 Labour 11 13 28 48
 Lib Dems 5 6 5 84
Responses
 Conservatives (244) 7 13 43 37
 Labour (336) 10 12 23 55
 Lib Dems (332) 5 6 6 83
Lib Dems: Liberal Democrats.
Table A1. The Electoral Impact of Constituency Campaigning (Seat Interactions).
Conservative Labour Liberal 
Democrats
 b Std. 
error
Sig. b Std. 
error
Sig. b Std. 
error
Sig.
Constant 1.743 1.637 n.s. 0.923 0.742 n.s. −4.605 0.446 **
Share of the electorate 2010 0.906 0.029 ** 0.779 0.041 ** 0.378 0.022 **
Campaign intensity 0.025 0.008 ** 0.033 0.009 ** 0.040 0.006 **
Labour seat 2010 −3.324 1.749 n.s. 6.691 2.376 ** 2.674 0.806 **
Campaign intensity × Labour seat 0.005 0.013 n.s. −0.019 0.017 n.s. −0.039 0.010 **
Lib Dem Seat 2010 −6.865 2.056 ** −5.204 1.721 ** 4.852 3.306 n.s.
Campaign intensity × Lib Dem seat 0.034 0.015 * 0.054 0.015 ** 0.014 0.022 n.s.
Adj. R2 0.967 0.923 0.908
N 219 309 302
Lib Dem: Liberal Democrat.
Dependent variable: share of electorate 2015.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; n.s.: not statistically significant; n/a: not applicable.
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Table A2. The Effect of Party Popularity on the Impact of Campaigning at District Level.
Conservative Labour Liberal 
Democrats
 b Std. 
error
Sig. b Std. 
error
Sig. b Std. 
error
Sig.
Constant 5.29 8.60 n.s. 22.53 9.71 * 7.18 2.37 **
Personal incumbent 3.90 0.95 ** 4.60 0.73 ** 3.91 0.73 **
Campaign intensity 0.00 0.08 n.s. −0.20 0.09 * −0.05 0.03 *
Likelihood win constituency (L1) −0.28 0.39 n.s. −1.00 0.41 * −0.69 0.16 **
L1 squared 0.01 0.00 * 0.01 0.00 ** 0.02 0.00 **
Campaign intensity* L1 0.00 0.00 n.s. 0.01 0.00 ** 0.01 0.00 **
Campaign intensity* L12 −0.00 0.00 n.s. −0.00 0.00 ** −0.00 0.00 **
Scotland −1.44 1.55 n.s. −5.48 0.85 ** 1.08 0.43 *
Wales −0.77 1.18 n.s. −2.49 1.07 * −0.06 0.54 n.s.
R2 0.87 0.84 0.89
N 244 336 332
Dependent variable: share of electorate 2015.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; n.s.: not statistically significant.
